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THE FUNDRAISERS, THE BEGGARS, AND THE HUNGRY: THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
RIGHTS TO SOLICIT DONATIONS, TO BEG FOR MONEY, AND TO SHARE FOOD 
NATE VOGEL* 
[. . .] [S]ome [. . .] citizens feel annoyed or guilty when faced with an indigent beggar, 
and that there is criminal conduct on the streets. Feelings of annoyance or guilt, however, cannot 
outweigh the exercise of First Amendment rights.1 
INTRODUCTION 
One of the most exciting features of the Occupy movement is the emergence of econom-
ic injustice as an issue in mainstream American political discourse.  Commentators have declared 
that “Occupy Wall Street has changed the national conversation,” and even inside the Beltway, 
the movement has brought poverty and economic inequality into the center of mainstream politi-
cal discourse.2  If these commentators are right, advocates of reform may have an opportunity to 
begin to dismantle the financial engines that sustain massive economic inequality in the United 
States.  It is crucial that the movement maintains its focus and applies its energy toward advocat-
ing for a core principle: that a just economic system should provide security, stability, and oppor-
tunity for all. 
The economic inequality that drove protestors into public parks across the country is not 
a new development.  Poverty is deeply entrenched in American society, and millions of Ameri-
cans directly suffer from its effects.  According to the U.S. Census Bureau, between January 2004 
and December 2006, 28.9 percent of the US population was in poverty for at least two months.3  
Ten million people entered poverty during that time period, and 8.6 million approached the feder-
al poverty line.4 
Poverty holds the most vulnerable in the strongest grip.  The Census Bureau reported that 
children had a higher poverty rate than adults.5  They also stayed poor longer than adults did.6  
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1
Berkeley Cmty. Health Project v. City of Berkeley, 902 F.Supp. 1084, 1095 (N.D. Cal. 1995). 
2
Arianna Huffington, Occupy Wall Street has changed the national conversation, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (Jan. 
4, 2012), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/politics/sns-201201041800—tms—ahuffcoltq--m-a20120104jan04,0,6 
073728.column; Complete Transcript of the October 21, 2011 edition of ‘Countdown with Keith Olbermann’ (Oct. 21, 
2011), http://current.com/shows/countdown/blog/complete-transcript-of-the-october-21-2011-edition-of-countdown-with-
keith-olbermann (guest Paul Krugman saying “[A] group of people started camping out in Zuccotti Park, and all of a sud-
den the conversation has changed significantly towards being about the right things. It’s kind of a miracle.”). 
3
US CENSUS BUREAU, DYNAMICS OF ECONOMIC WELL-BEING: POVERTY, 2004-2006 2 (2011), available at 
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/poverty/publications/dynamics04/P70-123.pdf. 
4
Id. at 5. 
5
Id. at 3 (“Children under 18 years had a higher episodic poverty rate (36.4 percent) and a higher chronic 
poverty rate (4.8 percent) than adults.  The median length of a poverty spell for children under 18 years (5.2 months) was 
longer than the median length of a poverty spell for adults 18 to 64 years (4.2 months) but shorter than the median spell 
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Female-householder families had a higher poverty rate than other families.7  African Americans 
were disproportionately impoverished.8  Even deeper down the mineshaft of misfortune are those 
without a permanent home.  The National Law Center on Homelessness and Poverty estimates 
that 3 million people experience homelessness each year.9  The same organization estimates that 
1.3 million of those in poverty each year are children.10 
Perhaps worse than the fact that so many millions still suffer from profound poverty is 
the prevalence of laws that actively seek to erase them from the public spaces that are very nearly 
the last place they can go.  The National Coalition for the Homeless released a report in 2009 that 
identified a range of creative ways that local governments try to drive the homeless out of their 
public parks, streets, and sidewalks.11  Many towns and cities criminalize sitting, sleeping, or stor-
ing goods in public places.12  Many selectively enforce “more neutral laws, such as loitering, jay-
walking, or open container laws, against homeless persons.”13  Cities and towns have adopted 
laws that punish begging “in order to move poor or homeless persons out of a city or downtown 
area.”14  A growing number of jurisdictions have passed laws that “restrict groups sharing food 
with homeless persons in public spaces.”15  Laws such as these are pervasive throughout the Unit-
ed States.  The study found that between one third and one half of the cities surveyed had enacted 
some form of anti-homelessness law.16  Prohibitions on begging, for example are very common: 
47 percent of the cities surveyed prohibited begging in particular public places, 49 percent prohi-
bited “aggressive panhandling,” and 23 percent banned begging city-wide.17These laws deny the 
poor the right to use public spaces as freely as those who have no need to beg.  These laws only 
burden those who to need to beg or to sleep on benches.  Unfortunately, however, the Supreme 
Court of the United States has repeatedly declared that it will give wide discretion to governments 
that pass laws targeting individuals based on poverty.  As Stephen Loffredo explains, 
                                                          
length of adults 65 and over (6.7 months).”). 
6
Id. at 8 (“While children made up about 26 percent of the total population, they represented approximately 
33 percent of those who were poor at least 2 months and about 45 percent of those who were poor for the entire 36 
months.”). 
7
Id. at 3-4 (“People in female-householder families had a higher episodic poverty rate (51.8 percent), higher 
chronic poverty rate (9.7 percent), and longer median poverty spell (6.4 months) than people in married -couple fami-
lies).”). 
8
Id. at 8 (“Blacks were 12.5 percent of the entire population, 19.6 percent of the population with at least 
one poverty spell, and 37.6 percent of the chronically poor.”). 
9
NATIONAL LAW CENTER ON HOMELESSNESS AND POVERTY, HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY IN AMERICA, 




NATIONAL COALITION FOR THE HOMELESS, HOMES NOT HANDCUFFS 9-12 (2009), http://www.nlchp.org/ 
content/pubs/2009HomesNotHandcuffs1.pdf. 
12
See id. at 9. 
13






See id. at 10. 
17
NATIONAL COALITION FOR THE HOMELESS, supra note 11, at 10. 
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Two decades ago, the Supreme Court held that the constitutional claims of poor 
people would be assessed under so-called rationality review.  The judiciary 
must broadly defer to political outcomes in the area of “economics and social 
welfare.” . . . [E]ven explicit legislative discrimination against poor people does 
not trigger heightened judicial scrutiny.18 
The Supreme Court held in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez that 
discrimination based on wealth was not grounds for heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause.19  The Court found that the poor did not share the same characteristics as groups that 
do receive heightened protection.  According to the Court, “the system of alleged discrimination 
and the class it defines have none of the traditional indicia of suspectness: the class is not saddled 
with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated 
to such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the ma-
joritarian political process.”20  Consequently, the Court refused to add wealth to the list of kinds 
of discrimination that are suspect. 
Whether the Court decided rightly is highly contested.  For example, Watson argues that 
the homeless do meet the criteria of a suspect class and that the Supreme Court should declare the 
homeless to be such a class deserving heightened scrutiny.21  She identifies consequences of dec-
laring that homelessness is a suspect class.22  However, “the Supreme Court has clearly refused to 
extend special judicial protection to poor people, including the homeless, by repeatedly reciting 
that poverty is not a suspect class.”23  Because of this rule that gives substantial deference to ci-
ties, challenging laws that target the poor under the Equal Protection Clause is a difficult proposi-
tion. 
The Occupy protests aim to confront these economic and legal structures that keep so 
many in deep poverty.  However, there is a growing risk that the national conversation that the 
Occupy movement has sparked could be redirected towards debates about the protestors them-
selves.  Much of the legal action around Occupy has been channeled towards defending the First 
Amendment rights of protestors.  Focusing exclusively on protestors and their rights to protest 
could siphon energy away from the original purpose of Occupy. 
This paper argues that the First Amendment can make a contribution to the Occupy 
movement beyond protecting the right to protest.  The First Amendment protection of freedom of 
speech can also be an important tool for promoting economic justice.  Advocates can frame activi-
ties on behalf of the very poor, including soliciting donations, or providing food, as protest activi-
ties deserving of First Amendment protection.  Thus, the First Amendment can offer a mechanism 
to challenge certain laws that target the poor.  By developing these First Amendment challenges, 
advocates for equality can confront and perhaps defeat laws that Equal Protection doctrine cannot 
address. 
First, this paper examines the First Amendment protection for the right of charitable or-
ganizations to solicit contributions.  This right today is relatively uncontroversial and conforms to 
our traditional intuitions about what the First Amendment ought to protect.  It provides the basis 
for more controversial First Amendment rights. 
Second, the paper examines the right of the destitute to beg for money.  This right is 
more contested than the right of organizations to solicit contributions.  By analogizing begging for 
money to soliciting donations, courts have extended the First Amendment protection recognized 
for charities.  The outer limits of the right are not clear, and the right is still challenged by laws 
                                                          
18
Stephen Loffredo, Poverty, Democracy and Constitutional Law, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1277, 1278 (1993). 
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that ban “aggressive panhandling” or require licenses for panhandling.  I argue that courts recog-
nizing First Amendment protection for the right to beg are right to do so. 
Third, the paper examines a more recent struggle over prohibitions on sharing food in 
public parks.  I propose that First Amendment protection for food sharing should be extended just 
as it was for soliciting donations and begging.  By conducting large group food distributions, or-
ganizations have been able to simultaneously feed needy people and raise awareness about pover-
ty in America.  Unfortunately, courts have a mixed record of providing First Amendment protec-
tion for sharing food.  I argue that the First Amendment is and should be a tool to defend food 
sharing. 
The goal of this paper is to identify how the First Amendment’s protection for free ex-
pression has grown, and to suggest how advocates can continue to help it grow.  It traces how 
First Amendment protection that emerged for charitable solicitation came to encompass begging 
as well.  It presents the first salvos in the struggle to carry the First Amendment’s protection for 
charities and begging towards providing protection for political protests that are carried out by 
giving free food to the needy. 
With decisions like Citizens United, the First Amendment protects the access of wealthy 
corporations to our elections more and more aggressively.  The First Amendment can and should 
be a tool to promote access of the poor to our public spaces at least as aggressively. 
II. THE RIGHT TO SOLICIT DONATIONS 
There is no doubt today that the First Amendment protects the right to solicit donations 
for charity.  The Supreme Court established the parameters of First Amendment protection for the 
right to solicit donations in a trilogy of cases: Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment,24 
Secretary of State of Maryland v. Joseph H. Munson Co.,25 and Riley v. National Federation of 
the Blind of North Carolina.26  In the foundational Schaumburg decision, the Supreme Court 
struck down a municipal ordinance that required charitable organizations to get a permit before 
they could solicit donations door-to-door in their community.27  The Court struck down the law 
because the municipality did not have a strong enough interest in imposing a substantial limitation 
on the protected activity of soliciting donations door-to-door.28 
                                                          
19




See Jennifer E. Watson, Note, When No Place is Home: Why the Homeless Deserve Suspect Classifica-
tion, 88 IOWA L. REV. 501, 515-33 (2002-03). 
22
Id. at 533. 
23
Id. at 512. 
24
444 U.S. 620, 622 (1980) (finding that soliciting for a charity is protected speech under the First Amend-
ment).  See also Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Assocs., 538 U.S. 600, 617 (2003) (affirming Schaumburg and 
clarifying that while the First Amendment protects charitable solicitation, it does not protect against fraudulent solicita-
tion). 
25
467 U.S. 947 (1984). 
26
487 U.S. 781 (1988). 
27
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The Court first inquired whether soliciting donations is actually expression protected by 
the First Amendment.  It held that solicitation is protected expression because it is intertwined 
with important political communication from solicitors to those being solicited. The court ex-
plained: 
[S]olicitation is characteristically intertwined with informative and perhaps per-
suasive speech seeking support for particular causes or for particular views on 
economic, political, or social issues, and for the reality that without solicitation 
the flow of such information and advocacy would likely cease. Canvassers in 
such contexts are necessarily more than solicitors for money.29 
The Court then held that the town’s permit requirement was unconstitutionally over-
broad.  The ordinance only allowed charitable organizations that could demonstrate that “at least 
seventy-five percent of the proceeds of such solicitations will be used directly for the charitable 
purpose of the organization.”30  The Court found that there were certain classes of organizations 
that would be impermissibly barred from soliciting contributions by this law.  For example, the 
petitioners’ organization raised money to pay canvassers to go door-to-door to distribute literature 
and convince individuals of the organization’s political agenda.  The Court reasoned that the “75-
percent limitation is a direct and substantial limitation on protected activity that cannot be sus-
tained unless it serves a sufficiently strong, subordinating interest that the Village is entitled to 
protect.”31  The Village claimed that the law was justified by its interest to prevent fraud and an-
noyance, but the Court disagreed.  It conceded that preventing fraud is a substantial interest, but 
one that was only “peripherally promoted by the 75-percent requirement and [which] could be 
sufficiently served by measures less destructive of First Amendment interests.”32 
Justice Rehnquist dissented from the opinion.  His argument about why solicitation 
should not be protected under the First Amendment is a recurring argument in begging and food-
sharing cases.  And in fact it foreshadowed the future debates over protection for begging.  He 
wrote: 
I believe that the Court overestimates the value, in a constitutional sense, of 
door-to-door solicitation for financial contributions and simultaneously underes-
timates the reasons why a village board might conclude that regulation of such 
activity was necessary . . . I believe that a simple request for money lies far 
from the core protections of the First Amendment as heretofore interpreted. In 
the case of such solicitation, the community’s interest in insuring that the col-
lecting organization meets some objective financial criteria is indisputably va-
lid. Regardless of whether one labels noncharitable solicitation “fraudulent,” 
nothing in the United States Constitution should prevent residents of a commu-
nity from making the collective judgment that certain worthy charities may soli-
                                                          
29
Id. at 632. 
30
Id. at 624. 
31
Id. at 636. 
32
Id. 
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cit door to door while at the same time insulating themselves against panhan-
dlers, profiteers, and peddlers.33 
Although the right to solicit does not directly arise out of what is known as public forum 
doctrine, understanding that the laws that restrain expressive activity in traditional public fora are 
particularly suspect is crucial to understanding how the First Amendment should protect solicita-
tion.  Public forum doctrine applies to much more than charitable solicitations, but the link be-
tween solicitation and public forum law is illustrated by International Society for Krishna Con-
sciousness Inc. v. Lee.34  In that case, the Port Authority of New York City banned the solicitation 
of funds in airport terminals.35  The International Society for Krishna Consciousness challenged 
the law, claiming that it violated their First Amendment right to solicit donations.36 
The Court explained that different standards of review apply for restrictions on expres-
sion that occur in different places.  In places that have “traditionally been available for public ex-
pression,” restraints are subject to “the highest scrutiny.”37  In this case, the Court ruled that air-
port terminals were not public fora, and so the limitation did not receive the highest scrutiny.38  As 
a result, the restriction imposed on solicitations only needed to “satisfy a requirement of reasona-
bleness.”39  The Court concluded that the restriction was reasonable because of the inconvenience 
to passengers of the solicitation.40 
Through these cases, solicitations for charity in public fora receive a high level of First 
Amendment protection.  And despite Justice Rehnquist’s objections in Schaumburg, this protec-
tion now also extends to soliciting charitable contributions for oneself—an activity also known as 
begging. 
III. THE RIGHT TO BEG FOR MONEY 
The right to beg for money may not seem to be within the traditional sphere of First 
Amendment speech.  Asking a stranger on the street for money—whether the money is for food, 
shelter, a cigarette, or anything else—seems at first to be very different from demanding political 
change or criticizing government action.  That was the conclusion of one of the first federal ap-
peals courts to consider the issue.41  However, since the 1990s, courts have gradually recognized 
First Amendment protection for begging.  And we should be glad that they have.  The most tradi-
tional kinds of First Amendment speech, such as publishing or protesting, are privileged activities 
that are mostly available to individuals with sufficient time, money, and other material re-
sources.42  And as the Supreme Court expands First Amendment protection for spending money to 
influence elections, the First Amendment may be developing a bias towards protecting the activi-
ties of the wealthiest the most.43  After Schaumburg, the First Amendment covered requests for 
donations to charitable organizations.  If the First Amendment were not able to reach requests for 
money that a person needed to use himself, a double standard would have crept into First 
Amendment doctrine: if you are asking for money for an established charity, and you are a volun-
teer or a salaried solicitor who does not need the money herself, the First Amendment will protect 
you, but if you are asking for money for yourself because you need it, the First Amendment is un-
                                                          
33
Id. at 644. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
34
505 U.S. 672, 677-78 (1992). 
35
See id. at 675-76. 
36
Id. at 676. 
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available.  Fortunately, courts have slowly recognized that there is at least some protection for so-
licitation on behalf of one’s self. 
A. Begging Is Protected Expression, and Total Prohibitions are Unconstitutional 
One of the first opinions to directly address the First Amendment protection for the right 
to beg was the Second Circuit’s decision in Young v. NYC Transit Authority.44  In 1989, the New 
York City Metro Transit Authority passed a regulation that banned begging in subways but per-
mitted certain other non-transit activities, including “solicitation for charitable, religious or politi-
cal causes.”45  The Legal Action Center for the Homeless filed a lawsuit claiming that the law vi-
olated, among other rights, the First Amendment right to free speech.46 
The Second Circuit held that the regulation did not violate the First Amendment.47  It 
first inquired whether begging receives any First Amendment protection at all, and decided that it 
probably did not.  The court explained that “[c]ommon sense tells us that begging is much more 
‘conduct’ than it is ‘speech.’”48  Relying on Texas v. Johnson,49 the court asked whether beggars 
intended to convey a particularized message and whether there is a great likelihood that those re-
ceiving the message will understand it.50  The court decided that neither part of the test was satis-
fied: “the only message we are able to espy as common to all acts of begging is that beggars want 
to exact money from those whom they accost.”51 
                                                          
37
Id. at 678. 
38
Id. at 680. 
39
Id. at 683. 
40
Id. at 685. 
41
See infra discussion at note 51 
42
See, e.g., extensive debates about privilege at Occupy protests around the country, including: John Chas-
noff & Sandra Tamari, Addressing Oppression, Racism and Privilege in the Occupy Movement, NEW LEFT PROJECT (Oct. 
15, 2011), http://www.newleftproject.org/index.php/site/print_article/addressing_oppression _racism_and_privilege_in_ 
the_occupy_movement; Kai Wright, Here’s to Occupying Wall Street! (If Only That Were Actually Happening), 
COLORLINES (Oct. 5, 2011), http://colorlines.com/archives/2011/10/heres_to_occupying_wall_street_if_only_ 
that_were_actually_happening.html (“There are literally millions of people who have been kicked out of their homes 
[…and ] caught in predatory debt traps […] They are […] overwhelmingly and not in the least bit coincidentally black 
people. And I suspect that until we build our politics around their participation, we will continue to miss the point.”); The 
Wednesday Weight-in: Occupy Wall Street and Confronting Privilege, FEMINISTING (Oct. 5, 2011), 
http://feministing.com/2011/10/05/the-wednesday-weigh-in-occupy-wall-street-and-confronting-privilege/. 
43
See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
44
903 F.2d 146 (2d Cir. 1990). 
45




Id. at 164. 
48
Id. at 153. 
49
491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989) (“In deciding whether particular conduct possesses sufficient communicative 
elements to bring the First Amendment into play, we have asked whether ‘[a]n intent to convey a particularized message 
was present, and [whether] the likelihood was great that the message would be understood by those who viewed it.’”). 
50
Young, 903 F.2d at 152. 
51
Id. at 154. 
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Assuming for the sake of argument that begging is expressive, the court also applied the 
O’Brien52 test to the ban on panhandling.53  It found that the statute did not violate the require-
ments of O’Brien because the court felt that there was a substantial government interest in pre-
venting harassment that accompanies begging.54  Furthermore, the court felt that a law banning 
begging was not targeted directly at any particular message.55  Begging, according to the court, 
was simply conduct that the city was well within its authority to proscribe. 
The law in the Second Circuit transformed with the Circuit’s landmark decision in Loper 
v. NYC Police Department.56  After Young, New York City police enforced a complete prohibition 
on panhandling in public in New York City.57  A class action lawsuit on behalf of “all ‘needy per-
sons who live in the State of New York, who beg on the public streets or in the public parks of 
New York City’” challenged the constitutionality of the ban.58 
The court analyzed whether begging is protected expression just as it had done in Young.  
But in a dramatic reversal, the court adamantly declared begging to be expression worthy of First 
Amendment protection.59  The court proclaimed, “it cannot be gainsaid that begging implicates 
expressive conduct or communicative activity.”60  Citing Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a 
Better Environment, the court recognized that there is no legitimate First Amendment distinction 
that governments or courts can make between speech for charitable organizations and begging.  
The court explained, 
We see little difference between those who solicit for organized charities and 
those who solicit for themselves in regard to the message conveyed.  The for-
mer are communicating the needs of others while the latter are communicating 
their personal needs. Both solicit the charity of others. The distinction is not a 
significant one for First Amendment purposes.61 
                                                          
52
United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968) (establishing a test to determine which level of 
scrutiny the Court should employ in cases where speech and nonspeech elements are present in conduct because the Court 
held that “it is, in short, not simply the verbal or nonverbal nature of the expression, but the governmental interest at stake, 
that helps to determine whether a restriction on that expression is valid”). 
53
Young, 903 F.2d at 157 (stating the test as “[p]ursuant to O’Brien, ’a government regulation is sufficient-
ly justified’ when: (1) ‘it is within the constitutional power of the Government;’ (2) ‘it furthers an important or substantial 
governmental interest;’ (3) ‘the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression;’ and (4) ‘the inci-
dental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.’). 
54
Id. at 158. 
55
Id. at 168. 
56
See 999 F.2d 699, 705 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that a New York statute prohibiting loitering in public 
places for purposes of begging violated the First Amendment). 
57
Peter A. Barta, Note, Giuliani, Broken Windows, and the Right to Beg, 6 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 
165 (1999).  The law stated, “A person shall be guilty of loitering when he: 1. Loiters, remains or wanders in a public 
place for the purpose of begging.” Loper, 999 F.2d at 701 (citing N.Y. Penal Law § 240.35(1) (McKinney 1989)). 
58
Loper, 999 F.2d at 701. 
59




Id. at 704. 
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Furthermore, begging, according to the court, carries a particular social message.62  
Simply seeing and hearing a person begging imparts a message that requires passers-by to consid-
er the beggar’s plight.  Even if a beggar does not accompany a request for money with a statement 
about his need for shelter, food, or other support, “the presence of an unkempt and disheveled 
person holding out his or her hand or a cup to receive a donation itself conveys a message of need 
for support and assistance.”63 
The court applied the public forum doctrine and subjected the law to strict scrutiny.64  
Restraints on speech in places that are traditionally open to public expression receive the highest 
scrutiny.  The streets, parks, and city sidewalks to which the ordinance applied are among the 
spaces that “have immemorially held in trust for the use of the public” and public expression.65  
Restraints on speech in traditional public fora are valid only if either the restraint “is necessary to 
serve a compelling state interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that end,” or if the restraint 
can be characterized as “regulations of the time, place and manner of expression which are con-
tent-neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve significant government interests, and leave open ample 
alternate channels of communication.”66 
The restraint on begging failed this test.  It was not content-neutral because “it prohibits 
all speech related to begging.”67  Unlike Young, the court here felt that begging itself is an expres-
sive message, and targeting begging is targeting a particular message–the request for money. 
Nor was it necessary to serve a compelling state interest or narrowly tailored. The law 
banned all begging to address the problems of separate crimes (i.e. fraud and harassment) that the 
city said were connected to begging.68  The city defended its law as necessary to prevent the crime 
and other evils to which begging leads.69  The city made arguments to defend its statute that are 
familiar to advocates for homeless individuals.  The court reported that “[t]he City Police regard 
the challenged statute as an essential tool to address the evils associated with begging on the 
streets of New York City.”70  The police argued that begging harms commerce when “[r]esidents 
are intimidated and local businesses suffer accordingly.”71  Other conduct of panhandlers is more 
serious; “[p]anhandlers have been known to block the sidewalk, follow people down the street 
and threaten those who do not give them money” and, also, “[i]t is said that they often make false 
and fraudulent representations to induce passers-by to part with their money.”72  With a hint of 
sarcasm, the Circuit court summarized the city’s argument by stating that 
[t]he City Police advance the theory that panhandlers, unless stopped, tend to 
increase their aggressiveness and ultimately commit more serious crimes.  Ac-
                                                          
62
Arguably, this rationale fails the Texas v. Johnson test that only provides First Amendment protection for 
speech where the speaker intends to deliver a particularized message. 
63




Id. at 703 (citing Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939)). 
66
Id. (citing Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)). 
67
Id. at 705. 
68
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cording to this theory, what starts out as peaceful begging inevitably leads to the 
ruination of a neighborhood.  It appears from the contentions of the City Police 
that only the challenged statute stands between safe streets and rampant crime 
in the city.73 
Though preventing crimes such as fraud and harassment is a substantial government interest, ban-
ning begging was too broad a prohibition than was necessary.  The regulation was consequently a 
violation of the First Amendment.74 
Loper remains arguably the most significant and most expansive circuit court decision 
recognizing the First Amendment protection for begging, but other courts have also recognized 
that begging is expression.  Even before Loper, a district court in California found that begging is 
expressive conduct and struck down a prohibition on begging, though the appeals court did not 
make a decision on the law’s validity under the First Amendment.75  The challengers successfully 
convinced the court that constitutional protection for charitable solicitation (the kind recognized 
in Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment) could not be withheld from begging.  The 
court explained: 
Begging can promote the very speech values that entitle charitable appeals to 
constitutional protection. A request for alms clearly conveys information regarding the 
speaker’s plight. Begging gives the speaker an opportunity to spread his views and ideas 
on, among other things, the way our society treats its poor and disenfranchised. And in 
some cases, a beggar’s request can change the way the listener sees his or her relation-
ship with and obligations to the poor. “Begging does considerably more than ‘propose a 
commercial transaction.’ Like other charitable requests, begging appeals to the listener’s 
sense of compassion or social justice, rather than to his economic self-interest.” . . . That 
many beggars fail to so inform or affect their listeners is irrelevant. Many charitable soli-
citors fail to educate, enlighten, or persuade their listeners.76  Other federal and state 
courts have also applied Loper’s protection for the right to beg within their own jurisdic-
tions.77 
The Supreme Court has still never held whether begging is protected expression.  Nor 
has it explained exactly what test should apply to begging.  However, there are hints that the Su-
preme Court would find it to be protected if it were required to decide.  In Nixon v. Shrink Mo. 
PAC, the majority of the Supreme Court accepted a campaign finance limitation.78  Justices Ken-
nedy and Thomas sharply dissented, complaining that such limitations on election spending 
should be invalid, considering the scope of First Amendment protection for other activities.  Their 
dissent cited Loper and opined, “the Courts of Appeals have followed our lead and concluded that 
the First Amendment protects, for example, begging, shouting obscenities, erecting tables on a 
sidewalk, and refusing to wear a necktie.”79  Their criticism appears to accept First Amendment 
protection for begging.  If Justices Kennedy and Thomas are willing to accept First Amendment 
protection for begging, it seems likely that if the highest court hears the question, a majority will 
agree that begging is expression that deserves at least some form of First Amendment scrutiny. 
B. Indirect or Limited Restraints on Begging Are Still Common 
Prohibitions on begging that are more limited that the city-wide law in Loper remain 
common and are frequently upheld.  They can take many forms, including explicit prohibitions of 
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begging in certain areas, prohibitions of certain conduct related to begging, or more indirect re-
straints such as requiring permits for panhandling. 
Several courts have upheld prohibitions on begging in narrowly defined areas. In McFar-
lin v. DC, the DC Court of Appeals allowed an ordinance that banned begging at subway stops.80  
The court cited to Loper and recognized that begging had been recognized as protected expres-
sion.81  However, the court did not decide the question for its own jurisdiction, but only assumed 
that begging is protected activity and upheld the ordinance anyway.  It reasoned that a subway 
stop is not a public forum.82  Therefore, heightened public forum scrutiny was not necessary.  In-
stead a more relaxed standard was appropriate, and preventing begging in the subway entrance 
was reasonable way to keep order in a very busy “funnel” into the subway.83 
The Court of Appeals of New York approved a law that barred panhandlers from solicit-
ing at roadsides from people in their cars.84  It assumed panhandling is protected expression, but 
that restraining the activity was content-neutral and a reasonable time, place, and manner regula-
tion of the government’s interest in protecting safety and traffic flow on roadways.85 
The Eleventh Circuit upheld Fort Lauderdale’s ban on begging in a beach area as a rea-
sonable time, place, and manner restraint.86  The Seventh Circuit permitted Indianapolis to ban 
panhandling at night.87  In that case, the plaintiffs did not argue that the restraint on begging was 
                                                          
74
Id. at 705-06. 
75
See Blair v. Shanahan, 775 F.Supp. 1315, 1325-26 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (“Solicitations for alms are not gen-
erally and frequently enough proxies for intimidating or coercive threats to justify this statute. This case falls squarely un-
der the holding in Carey; the statute violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
76
Id. at 1322-23 (citation omitted). 
77
See Gresham v. Peterson, 225 F.3d 899, 907 (7th Cir. 2000) (upholding a partial ban on begging, explain-
ing that it was “a far cry from the total citywide ban on all panhandling overturned by the court in Loper); Smith v. City of 
Fort Lauderdale, 177 F.3d 954 (11th Cir. 1999) (upholding a regulation that proscribed begging on the beach and side-
walks because it was narrowly tailored to serve the City’s interest in providing a safe, pleasant environment); Henry v. 
City of Cincinnati, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94704 at *18 (S.D. Oh. 2006) (“After Schaumburg, lower federal courts and 
state courts have equated panhandling to charitable contributions, and analyzed them under the same framework”); 
78
Nixon v. Shrink Mo. PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 411-12 (2000). 
79
Id. at 412 (citing Loper v. NYC Police Dept., 999 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1993)). 
80
681 A.2d 440 (D.C. 1996). 
81
Id. at 447. 
82
See id. at 448 (“No one can fairly argue that the entranceway to (or point of egress from) a subway esca-
lator-defined as the area within fifteen feet of the entrance-is a place whose principal purpose is the free exchange of ideas. 
Its primary purpose, indeed its only practical purpose, is as an area within which pedestrian traffic is funnelled onto the 
escalator. Moreover, it is not a ‘designated public forum’; WMATA has explicitly prohibited expressive activity within 




People v. Barton, 12 Misc.3d 322, 322-23 (N.Y. App. Term 2006). Cf. People v. Hoffstead, 28 Misc.3d 
16 (N.Y. App. Term 2010) (striking down a prohibition against “loitering for the purpose of begging” was over-broad be-
cause it amounted to a “sweeping prohibition of all begging at all times.”). 
85
Barton , 12 Misc.3d at 329-30. 
86
Smith, 177 F.3d 954 (11th Cir. 1999). 
87
Gresham, 225 F.3d at 905-906 (7th Cir 2000) (“Colorable arguments could be made both for and against 
the idea the Indianapolis ordinance is a content-neutral time, place, or manner restriction [….] Because the parties here 
agree that the regulations are content neutral, we need not decide whether the Indianapolis ordinance can be justified with-
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not content-neutral, so the court applied the intermediate public forum standard and found that the 
regulation was a reasonable time, place, and manner restraint that was “narrowly tailored to serve 
a significant government interest, and [left] open ample alternative channels for communica-
tion.”88 
These cases demonstrate that the question of whether begging laws are content-neutral is 
unsettled.  How a court answers that question heavily influences the outcome of the case.  The 
Court of Appeals of New York and the Eleventh Circuit both found that the bans on begging were 
content-neutral, and therefore, the bans only received the intermediate level of public forum scru-
tiny.  In contrast, Loper found that a city-wide ban on begging was not content-neutral.  The Se-
venth Circuit found compelling arguments on both sides of the question but did not decide.89  The 
Ninth Circuit certified the question to the California Supreme Court, which decided that under 
California law begging bans are content neutral.90  Advocates will need to continue to assert that 
begging bans are not content-neutral if they hope to successfully challenge partial bans on beg-
ging. 
Another common partial restraint on begging that courts have accepted is a prohibition of 
“aggressive panhandling.”  Philadelphia has a typical statute: 
Aggressive Conduct on the Sidewalk Prohibited: 
(a) Solicit money for any purpose on the public sidewalk in an aggressive man-
ner, or accompanied by conduct, including but not limited to repeated begging, 
insistent panhandling, retaliatory comments, blockage of free passage of a pede-
strian, touching or yelling at a pedestrian, confrontation or intimidation, which 
is likely to cause a reasonable person to fear bodily harm to oneself or another, 
or damage to or loss of property. 
(b) Solicit money for any purpose on the public sidewalk in any manner, within 
an eight foot (8’) radius of any building entrance, or within an eight foot (8’) 
radius of any vending cart. 
(c) Solicit money for any purpose on the public sidewalk in any manner, within 
a twenty foot (20’) radius of any bank entrance or any automatic teller ma-
chine.91 
The Seventh Circuit upheld a prohibition on aggressive panhandling in the same case in which it 
upheld the prohibition on all nighttime panhandling.92  Additionally, the district court of Washing-
                                                          
out reference to the content of the regulated speech.”). 
88
Id. at 905 (citing Perry, 460 U.S. at 45). 
89
Id. at 906. 
90
Los Angeles Alliance for Survival v. City of Los Angeles, 224 F.3d 1076 (2000). 
91
PHILA. PA CODE § 10-611(4); see also Jason Leckerman, Comment, City of Brotherly Love?: Using the 
Fourteenth Amendment to Strike Down an Anti-Homeless Ordinance in Philadelphia, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 540, 542 
(2001) (“The Philadelphia ‘Sidewalk Behavior Ordinance’ prohibits many activities in which segments of the homeless 
population often engage: panhandling within eight feet of a building entrance or vending truck or within twenty feet of a 
bank entrance or an automated-teller machine, lying on the public sidewalk (except in a medical emergency), sitting on the 
sidewalk for more than thirty minutes in a two-hour period, and, in certain instances, aggressive panhandling.”). 
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ton upheld an aggressive panhandling ordinance, even though it struck down the part that it consi-
dered to be over-broad.93 
Some laws indirectly limit begging by regulating the use of public space.  However, 
courts are not in agreement on how to treat these laws.  For example, the Ninth Circuit upheld a 
law banning sitting on public sidewalks.94  The court reasoned that although sitting could some-
times be expressive, it was not “integral to, or commonly associated with, expression” and “sub-
ject to other valid legislation, homeless people remain free to beg on Seattle’s sidewalks.”95  In 
contrast, the district court for the Northern District of California rejected a ban on sitting on pub-
lic sidewalks as a violation of the First Amendment.96  It found that “there are numerous in-
stances” in which sitting could involve expression because sitting may be necessary for the dis-
abled to engage in expression or to enable speakers to avoid blocking traffic.97  This district court 
then applied the higher scrutiny public forum test and struck down the law because the law re-
strained sitting on sidewalks, which are traditional public fora.98 
Yet another type of indirect limitation on panhandling requires that panhandlers secure a 
permit for their activity.  For example, Howard County, Maryland requires licenses for “non-
transit activities” on roadways, which includes panhandling on roadsides.99  A person who wants 
to engage in such a non-transit activity in Howard County, which presumably includes panhan-
dling, is only able to obtain four permits per year and is required to pay an application fee of 
$100.00 for the privilege.100  The limit on the number of permits allowed and the application 
process required are likely to have the effect of making begging impossible on roadsides. 
These permit laws are subject to a set of cases dealing with laws that require licenses for 
engaging in First Amendment activity.  These types of licenses are prior restraints on expression, 
and the Supreme Court, in Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, explained that “there is a 
‘heavy presumption’ against the validity of a prior restraint”101  Despite this presumption, “the 
Court has recognized that government, in order to regulate competing uses of public forums, may 
impose a permit requirement on those wishing to hold a march, parade, or rally.”102  Forsyth 
County created an ordinance that required permits for activities like parades and demonstra-
tions.103  The ordinance was not content-neutral because the permit fee was based on the cost of 
the event to the county.  Speech with certain content was more expensive because of the costs in-
volved, and thus, these events incurred a higher fee.104  The effect here was to charge a higher fee 
                                                          
92
Gresham, 225 F.3d at 909. 
93
Roulette v. City of Seattle, 850 F. Supp. 1442, 1453 (D.Wash. 1994).  The plaintiffs in this case also chal-
lenged an ordinance banning sitting down on sidewalks.  The Court rejected the First Amendment argument, and the plain-
tiffs appealed the decision to the Ninth Circuit.  Roulette v. City of Seattle, 97 F. 3d 300 (9th Cir. 1996). 
94




Berkeley Cmty. Health Project v. City of Berkeley, 902 F. Supp. 1084, 1091-95 (1995). 
97












Id. at 126-27. 
104
Id. at 134 (“It is clear, however, that, in this case, it cannot be said that the fee’s justification has nothing 
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to some speakers than to others because of the content of their speech.  Similarly, Howard Coun-
ty’s licensing requirement is arguably also not content neutral for the same reason because its fee 
makes it possible for speakers with greater resources to deliver their messages, but makes it im-
possible for those who do not have the resources to cover the application fee to solicit the dona-
tions they need to support the desired event.105 
These examples demonstrate that while courts generally recognize panhandling as pro-
tected expression, they give a significant amount of discretion to local governments to impose 
partial restraints.  This line of case law also demonstrates that there are many competing standards 
of review for restraints on begging.  Laws requiring permits should be subject to the high standard 
of prior restraint scrutiny as in Forsyth County.  While the Second Circuit determined that re-
straints on begging were not content-neutral and needed strict scrutiny, the Eleventh Circuit and 
New York’s appeals court disagreed.106  The Seventh Circuit would not decide.107  To prevent the 
First Amendment from developing a bias towards protecting privileged speakers more than un-
derprivileged ones, ensuring strong protection for the right to beg is important.  The first phase of 
this campaign, convincing courts that begging is protected expression, has largely been won.  The 
next phase must be to convince courts to apply higher levels of scrutiny to restrictions, and the 
cases demonstrate that this phase is far from complete. 
 
IV. THE RIGHT TO GIVE AWAY FOOD 
In the past few years, local governments have adopted yet another strategy for making 
public spaces uncomfortable for the poor.  Local governments in cities across the United States 
have enacted laws that ban sharing food under certain conditions.  The most burdensome are regu-
lations on groups that regularly gather in public parks to provide free food to those in need. 
These laws share a great deal with laws banning begging.  Similar to laws that ban begging, laws 
that regulate group feeding attempt to drive the poorest members of society out of the public’s 
sight.  Because the First Amendment limits laws banning begging, the First Amendment can be an 
important tool for challenging laws that ban sharing food. 
A. The Doctrine About How to Analyze the First Amendment’s Application to Food Sharing is 
Unsettled 
Courts across the country have heard a handful of challenges to laws that ban or restrain 
public food distribution, and have reached inconsistent conclusions about how to understand the 
expressive content of food sharing.  The circuitous history of the Eleventh Circuit’s First Vaga-
bonds Church v. Orlando illustrates the difficulty that judges are having deciding how to scrutin-
ize bans on sharing food.  In this case, the Eleventh Circuit considered the City of Orlando’s ban 
                                                          
to do with content”) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). 
105
 See also Freedman v. State of Maryland 380 U.S. 51 (1965) (Law may not delegate overly broad licens-
ing discretion to a government official); Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989); Lady J. Lingerie v City of 
Jacksonville, 176 F.3d 1358 (1999) (holding that a law providing discretion to an official to simply delay permit approval 
forever is invalid); cf. Thomas v. Chicago Park District, 534 U.S. 316 (2002) (finding that a permit requirement for public 
assemblies with more than 50 people to be a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction on expression). 
106
Smith, 177 F.3d 954 (11th Cir. 1999); Barton, 12 Misc.3d at 329-30 (N.Y.App. Term 2006). 
107
Gresham, 225 F.3d at 905-906 (7th Cir 2000). 
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on large group feedings.108  As the challenge made its way from trial-level through the appeals 
process, each set of judges examining the law applied a different standard of review under the 
First Amendment.  This case demonstrates that while there are compelling reasons to find that 
sharing food can be a highly expressive activity, there is no consensus about how to fit sharing 
food into modern First Amendment doctrine. 
Orlando’s law made it unlawful for anyone to participate in a large group feeding in a 
public park without a permit.109  The ordinance also limited the number of permits an organization 
could receive to two per year per park.110  The law particularly impacted two organizations that 
regularly provided food to the needy.  The first organization, the First Vagabonds Church of God, 
provided food to its members who were mostly homeless.  The second organization, Food Not 
Bombs is a charitable organization, which provided free food twice a week in an Orlando park.  
Food Not Bombs is a loosely organized international movement that distributes food to the hun-
gry.  By their own estimate, “there are over 1,000 chapters of Food Not Bombs active in over 60 
countries in Europe, the Middle East, Africa, the Americas, Asia, Australia, and New Zealand” 
and they claim to be “active in nearly 500 cities in the United States.”111  The organization de-
scribes its strategy as that by sharing food, it is engaging in a political protest: 
We recover food that would have been discarded and share it as a way of pro-
testing war and poverty . . .. Food Not Bombs is trying to motivate the public to 
focus our resources on solving problems like hunger, homelessness and poverty 
while seeking to end war and the destruction of the environment.112 
In 2005, the Orlando chapter of Food Not Bombs began distributing food in Lake Eola 
Park in Orlando every Wednesday at 5:00 PM.113  Starting in 2008, Food Not Bombs began offer-
ing free food on Mondays at 8:00 PM in 2008 in the same park.114  The First Vagabonds Church 
of God joined Food Not Bombs in Lake Eola Park but later moved to another park nearby.   
                                                          
108
First Vagabonds Church of God v. City of Orlando, 578 F. Supp. 2d 1353 (M.D. Fla. 2008); First Vaga-
bonds Church of God v. City of Orlando, 610 F. 3d 1274 (11th Cir. 2010); First Vagabonds Church of God v. City of Or-
lando, 638 F. 3d 756 (11th Cir. 2011). 
109









First Vagabonds Church, 638 F. 3d at 758. 
114
Id. 
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Orlando city officials justified the law as a necessary tool for maintaining the Lake Eola 
Park.  They testified that the law was intended to reduce the harm to Lake Eola Park from overuse 
and share the burden of large group feedings to other parks.115  Food Not Bombs, First Vagabonds 
Church, and individual members of both organizations, brought a complaint challenging the or-
dinance.  They claimed that the law violated Florida’s Religious Freedom Restoration Act, the 
Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, the Free Assembly Clause of the First Amendment, 
the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Free Speech 
clause of the First Amendment.116 
The district court struck down the law because it violated the First Amendment protec-
tions for free speech and free exercise of religion.  The court dismissed the church’s claim under 
Florida’s Religious Freedom Restoration Act.117  The court also dismissed the freedom of assem-
bly claim.118  Under the Free Exercise claim, the court found there was no rational basis for the 
statute and struck the statute down on those grounds in addition to on the grounds of the free 
speech violation.119 
When it turned to the First Amendment Free Speech claim, the court first examined 
whether food sharing is expressive conduct.  The court applied the two-part test from Texas v. 
Johnson that governs when conduct is sufficiently expressive to receive protection under the First 
Amendment.120  Under Texas v. Johnson, conduct is sufficiently expressive to trigger First 
Amendment protection if there is “an intent to convey a particularized message” and if there is a 
great likelihood “that the message would be understood by those who viewed it.121 
The court found that food sharing is expressive conduct.  First, the plaintiffs satisfied the 
requirement that the speakers have “an intent to convey a particularized message” because the in-
dividuals who testified about the organization’s message all “described the same basic substantive 
message” about the expressive content of sharing food.122  Second, the plaintiffs satisfied the re-
quirement that others understand their message because they provided testimony from individuals 
who had seen and understood their message.123 
The court next decided that the ordinance was content-neutral because the ordinance ap-
plied equally to all large groups sharing food in Orlando’s public parks.124  The court was not 
convinced that the ordinance targeted a particular message, even though it acknowledged that “the 
Ordinance clearly appears to have been passed with the intent of limiting, or even eliminating” the 
plaintiffs’ food sharing activities.125  Citing to US v. O’Brien,126 the district court explained that 




Id. at 762. 
117






Id. at 1358 (citing Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989)). 
121
Johnson, 491 U.S. at 404 (“In deciding whether particular conduct possesses sufficient communicative 
elements to bring the First Amendment into play, we have asked whether ‘[a]n intent to convey a particularized message 
was present, and [whether] the likelihood was great that the message would be understood by those who viewed it.’”). 
122






Id. at 1359. 
126
391 U.S. 367 (1968) 
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the ordinance was a content-neutral restraint on conduct containing speech and non-speech ele-
ments.127  Therefore, to justify the ordinance, the court required the City of Orlando to demon-
strate that its ordinance furthered “a substantial governmental interest and [that] the incidental re-
striction on [the plaintiffs’] First Amendment Freedoms [were] no greater than [was] essential to 
further that interest.”128 
The City offered three possible substantial government interests for the law, but the court 
rejected them all.  First, the City could not show that any crime actually arose as a result of the 
group feedings.129  Second, the City could not show that littering was a problem at the group feed-
ings; in fact, there was evidence that Orlando Food Not Bombs “clean[s] up when they are done 
and that they leave the park cleaner than it was when they arrived.”130  Finally, the court did not 
believe that the City’s evidence for the overuse of parks because of Food Not Bombs was credi-
ble.131  The court also criticized the ordinance for failing to even address the overuse problem 
since the ordinance did not limit the number of groups who could get permits on a single day or 
prevent different groups from holding large group feedings every day of the year.132 
The court sharply criticized “the final, and perhaps real, though unstated, reason for the 
City’s adoption of this ordinance: [. . .] discouraging the homeless from congregating in down-
town Orlando.”133  The City, the court argued, was not actually dealing with the problem of home-
lessness, but instead stifling protected expression to shuffle the problem out of sight.134  The court 
briefly mentioned that the suppression of speech was especially serious since it occurred in a park 
“which, from time immemorial, has been the traditional public forum for free speech.”135 
Because the court found that there was no substantial government interest in adopting the 
ordinance, the court did not have to examine if the ordinance was narrowly tailored.  Though the 
court mentioned the status of the park as a public forum, it did not engage in public forum analy-
sis.  Following O’Brien, the court held the ordinance violated the Free Speech Clause of the First 
Amendment.136 
Two years later, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court.137  The Circuit found for 
the City on all of the legal issues before the court: the Free Speech clause, the Free Exercise 
clause, the Due Process clause, the Equal Protection clause, and the Florida Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act.138  The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the ordinance did not violate the First 
Amendment because Food Not Bombs’ food sharing was not expressive conduct.  Similar to the 
                                                          
127
First Vagabonds Church, 578 F. Supp. 2d at 1359. 
128








Id.  The drafters of the ordinance may have been trying to avoid the constitutional problems of licenses 
for expressive activity by only allowing licenses to be denied for a single clear reason.  See supra text accompanying note 
95 (discussing licensing).  Ironically, this provision helped lead the district court to the conclusion that the ordinance vi-
olated the First Amendment for a different reason. Id. 
133






Id. at 1361. 
137
First Vagabonds, 610 F.3d at 1285. 
138
Id. at 1292. 
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district court, the Eleventh Circuit applied the test from Texas v. Johnson to determine if the con-
duct was expressive.139  The court agreed that Food Not Bombs had the intent to communicate a 
message and satisfied the first prong of the Johnson test.140  However, the court held that Food 
Not Bombs did not satisfy the second requirement that “the likelihood was great that the message 
would be understood by those who viewed it.”141  The court first clarified that the test is an objec-
tive one: “we ask whether the reasonable person would interpret it as some sort of message.”142  
For that reason, the court discounted the statements of the mayor and police officer that they had 
understood that Food Not Bombs was expressing a political message.143  Second, the court limited 
what it could consider pursuant to the test.  The court declared that “the [hypothetical] observer, 
however, is deaf and blind to explanatory speech – T-shirts, buttons, banners, speaking, and so on 
– accompanying the conduct.”144  Thus, the t-shirts, buttons, banners, statements, and other expla-
natory speech that Food Not Bombs engaged in along with sharing food could not be part of its 
evaluation of the expressive content of Food Not Bombs’ conduct.145 
After declaring that the testimony of witnesses to the food sharing as expressive conduct 
was irrelevant and that it would ignore every aspect of the food sharing except the physical act of 
sharing food, the court held that the conduct was not clearly expressive to the “reasonable observ-
er.”146  The court found that a “reasonable observer” was unable to distinguish the conduct of 
Food Not Bombs from “a family having a reunion, a church intending to engage in a purely cha-
ritable act, a restaurant distributing surplus food for free instead of throwing it away, or an organi-
zation trying to engage in a form of political speech.”147  After thus limiting the test for finding 
expressive conduct, the court concluded that the ordinance did not implicate enough expression to 
receive First Amendment scrutiny.148  A lone dissenter, Judge Barkett, sharply criticized how the 
majority limited the Johnson test.149  Judge Barkett argued that the court was wrong to strip the 
“reasonable observer” of her powers of reason and observation.150  Perhaps Judge Barkett was not 
alone in questioning the legal merits of the majority’s decision, because the court soon reconsi-
dered its conclusions. 
In a turn that highlights the salience of the food sharing question to the current state of 
First Amendment law, the Eleventh Circuit vacated its decision and decided to rehear the case en 
                                                          
139
Id. at 1282. 
140
Id. at 1282-83. 
141
Id. at 1282. 
142
Id. (emphasis in original). 
143
First Vagabonds, 610 F.3d at.1283 n.11. 
144




Id. at 1284-85. 
147
Id. at 1284-85. 
148
First Vagabonds, 610 F.3d at 1285. 
149
Id. at 1294 (Barkett, J., dissenting). 
150
Id. (“[T]o reach its result, the majority deconstructs the expressive conduct and strips it of every compo-
nent save the act of handing out food; but the Supreme Court has told us that we must analyze whether conduct is expres-
sive by viewing what is observable as a whole – not be dividing and isolating it into parts . . . [I]n every case posing the 
question of whether conduct is protected under the First Amendment, the Supreme Court has viewed observable conduct 
as a whole, rather than in isolated parts.”) 
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banc.151  The only issue to be briefed was the free speech question: “whether the ordinance as ap-
plied to Orlando Food Not Bombs violated the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.”152 
The rehearing did not reach the conclusion that First Vagabonds Church, Food Not 
Bombs, and those they supported must have hoped for.  The Eleventh Circuit again upheld the or-
dinance and found that it did not violate the First Amendment, but this time on the grounds that 
the ordinance satisfied scrutiny under O’Brien for restraints on expression.153  The court examined 
the ordinance as a “reasonable time, place or manner” restraint under the O’Brien test.154  Though 
the panel’s decision turned on the question of whether sharing food was expressive, the en banc 
court assumed, but did not decide, that “the feeding of homeless persons by Orlando Food Not 
Bombs is expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment.”155  The court nevertheless con-
cluded that the ordinance comported with the First Amendment. 
The court first decided that the ordinance was a reasonable time, place, or manner re-
striction on speech.156  The court held that the ordinance still provided Food Not Bombs with am-
ple opportunity to engage in its activity.157  The ordinance allowed Food Not Bombs to obtain two 
permits a year at each of the 42 other parks in downtown Orlando “for a total of 84 group feed-
ings at parks within a two-mile radius of City Hall,” and to conduct unlimited feedings at any of 
the sixty-six parks outside of the downtown area.158  The court did not consider the impact of hav-
ing to constantly change locations on the group feeding or the importance of being at the particu-
lar park that they had chosen.  The court also held that the ordinance was reasonable because it 
did not limit Food Not Bombs from conducting as many political rallies as the group liked.  The 
court ignored the expressive content of the act of providing food.159 
The court also concluded that the ordinance satisfied the O’Brien test.160  Unfortunately 
it offered no analysis for its legal conclusions.  First, the court stated the ordinance was clearly 
within the constitutional authority of the city to enact.161  Second “the city has a substantial inter-
est in managing park property and spreading the burden of large group feedings throughout a 
greater area and those interests are plainly served by the ordinance.”162  Third, the city’s substan-
tial interest was “unrelated to the suppression of speech.”163  And last, because the city was in the 
best position to decide how best to manage its parks, “the incidental restriction of alleged free-
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doms under the First Amendment is not greater than necessary to further the interest of the 
City.”164  The Eleventh Circuit did not even consider the applicability of public forum doctrine. 
After the en banc rehearing, what is the law in Eleventh Circuit about whether sharing 
food is protected expression?  The panel clearly decided it was not.  However, the en banc opi-
nion assumed but did not decide that it was protected expression.  The Eleventh Circuit did not 
overrule its earlier ruling.  However, the fact that the court also considered the next steps of the 
analysis suggests that the court’s commitment to the first ruling may not be especially strong.  In 
the first hearing on the matter, the Eleventh Circuit conceded that it might be willing to find, with-
in another set of facts, that the act of feeding could be sufficiently expressive to receive First 
Amendment protection.165  However, under the severely limited test the court adopted, which re-
quires the court to examine only the act of feeding itself and none of the accompanying expres-
sion, such as banners or speech, it is difficult to imagine a set of facts that might convince this 
court to find feeding to be expressive. 
The Orlando Food Not Bombs chapter insists they will keep feeding the homeless de-
spite the ordinance.166  One member told a reporter that the court’s decision did not dissuade the 
group from sharing food: “There is no real change–we’re here today, we’ll be here Sunday, we’ll 
be here next Wednesday.”167  As of April 13, 2011, the City of Orlando had not yet decided how 
to enforce the ordinance, but the mayor expressed his intention to do so, and told the public, “I 
certainly hope that law-abiding citizens that are not out to make mischief would adhere to the or-
dinance.”168  Although the court upheld the ordinance, there are still political obstacles to pushing 
Food Not Bombs and the homeless out of the parks.  As a member of Food Not Bombs pointed 
out, “we vote.”169 
Other challenges to food sharing restraints further demonstrate that there is no consensus 
about the reach of First Amendment protection for food sharing, either for the primary question of 
whether food sharing is protected or the secondary question of what standard of review should 
apply if it is protected expression.  The Ninth Circuit upheld San Francisco’s system that required 
licenses for all large group food distribution events in parks in McHenry v. Agnos partially be-
cause it did not put any limits on the number of permits a group could receive.170  Thus, the regu-
lation did not have the effect of preventing Food Not Bombs from regularly engaging in its pro-
tests and group feedings.171 
Keith McHenry is the co-founder and member of Food Not Bombs in San Francisco. 
Food Not Bombs distributed food for free to residents of San Francisco and advocated for the 
homeless and poor in San Francisco.172  McHenry and Food Not Bombs did not comply with city 
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ordinances requiring permits and certain minimum sanitary conditions for the distribution of 
food.173  The city enjoined McHenry and Food Not Bombs from distributing food, and McHenry 
brought a § 1983 lawsuit challenging the injunction and the permit requirement.174  He claimed 
that “his distribution of food through [Food Not Bombs] constitutes expression protected by the 
First Amendment to the United States Constitution, and, consequently, that the permit ordinances 
constitute an unconstitutional burden on that expression.”175 
Just like in First Vagabonds Church, the district court decided that sharing food was not 
expression, but on appeal the Ninth Circuit assumed, without deciding, that food sharing was pro-
tected expression.176  Instead of deciding if the food distribution was expressive conduct, the court 
held that the restraints were content-neutral and that they were reasonable time, place, and manner 
restrictions.177  It applied a four part test for reasonableness from Clark v. Community for Creative 
Non-Violence.178  Under this test, restraints on expression are reasonable if (1) they are content-
neutral; (2) they serve a significant government interest; (3) they are narrowly tailored to serve 
that interest; and (4) they “leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the infor-
mation.”179 
The Ninth Circuit found the ordinances were content-neutral because they required any-
one distributing food to more than twenty-five people to get a license.180  The government had a 
substantial interest in ensuring adequate food quality and sanitation.181  Furthermore, the ordin-
ances were narrowly tailored because the permit system for food distribution gave the city “leve-
rage to ensure that food preparers adhere to minimum standards of health and sanitation.  By 
maintaining a system of special use permits for its parks, the city can prevent the abuse of park 
property and balance the competing uses to which citizens put them.”182  Finally, the court also 
found that the ordinances permitted alternative forms of communication.183  Similar to the Ele-
venth Circuit, the Ninth Circuit in McHenry did not recognize that the act of feeding carries its 
own expressive content that cannot be conveyed with explanatory speech.  The court wrote, 
“feeding the homeless in public parks is not the only way of calling attention to their plight.”184 
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in this case is much more limited than the Eleventh Cir-
cuit’s decision in First Vagabonds Church v. City of Orlando.  First, the Ninth Circuit opinion 
was non-precedential.185  Additionally, the Ninth Circuit never decided whether food sharing was 
expressive conduct.  And most importantly, the court noted that the ordinance at issue still al-
lowed Food Not Bombs to continue sharing food.186  The court pointed out that the ordinance only 
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required Food Not Bombs to get a license and comply with the city’s health codes.  Unlike the 
license requirement in First Vagabonds, the licensing requirement in San Francisco did not put an 
absolute limit on the number of permits Food Not Bombs could receive each year. 
The harshest law against food sharing was the law passed by the city of Las Vegas and 
eventually enjoined by the district court of Nevada.  Sacco v. City of Las Vegas illustrates that 
while not only are different standards of review applied to similar ordinances, there is also signifi-
cant variation among different food sharing ordinances.187 
The city of Las Vegas passed a number of laws aimed at deterring homeless individuals 
from congregating in city parks.  In 2006, the city council adopted a law that prohibited “the pro-
viding food or meals to the indigent for free or for a nominal fee.”188  The ordinance defined indi-
gent persons as “a person whom a reasonable ordinary person would believe to be entitled to ap-
ply for or receive assistance under NRS Chapter 428.”189  When an American Civil Liberties 
Union (ACLU) attorney questioned the constitutionality of the ordinance and the practicality of 
deciding who is an indigent, the mayor of Las Vegas answered, “certain truths are self-evident . . . 
you know who’s homeless.”190  Las Vegas also enforced a law requiring permits for any person 
hosting a group of twenty-five individuals or more.191  The ACLU brought a challenge to the food 
sharing laws after a number of activists engaged in civil disobedience to protest the ordinance.192 
The district court in Nevada enjoined enforcement of the ordinance banning sharing food 
with the indigent, but on other grounds than the First Amendment.193  The court decided that shar-
ing food was not inherently expressive conduct, and the ordinance still permitted them to chant, 
carry signs, or deliver their political message in other ways.194  Furthermore, even when applying 
the four part test for content-neutral restraints on expression, the court concluded that the law was 
“content-neutral, narrowly tailored to serve the City’s significant interests, and left undisturbed 
adequate alternative channels of communication.”195 
Regarding the permit requirement for large group events, the court decided that the law was a 
content-neutral regulation of the time, place, and manner of expression in the public forum of the 
park.196  Citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism,197 the court analyzed the law under the same four-
part test for reasonable restraints on expression that the Ninth Circuit used in McHenry.  It analo-
gized the permit requirement in Las Vegas to those in the license cases discussed above: Cox v. 
City of New Hampshire198 and Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement.199  The court concluded 
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that the permit system was reasonable and did not give excessive discretion to administrative offi-
cials.200 
Although the legal outcome of the case may have been viewed unfavorably by advocates 
of the First Amendment and the rights of the homeless, the practical consequences of the case 
were not so bleak.  The ACLU and the city reached a settlement to end the litigation.201  Under the 
terms of the settlement, the city modified its rules regarding sharing food in the parks.202 
B. Advocates Challenging Food Sharing Laws Can Help Judges Navigate a Confusing Reef of 
Standards of Review 
The challenges to food sharing laws are ripe for advocates to continue pressing courts.  
Advocates may be able to convince judges to adopt a more permissive interpretation of the First 
Amendment’s protection for political demonstrations that involve food sharing.  The cases dem-
onstrate that courts are unsure of how to handle the issue.  Is sharing food expressive?  If it is, 
does O’Brien apply?  Or is content-neutral public forum reasonableness a more appropriate test? 
What about non-content-neutral public forum strict scrutiny?  Through litigation and careful fram-
ing, advocates can help courts understand what many anti-food sharing laws are.  They are laws 
that limit a particular kind of expression: sharing food with the poor to express dissent from con-
temporary society’s attitude toward poverty.  They target that particular message, and apply in the 
most public of public fora–the parks.  Advocates can make distinctions between laws that simply 
require all food distribution to meet certain health standards and laws that make the activities of 
political organizations like Food Not Bombs illegal. 
Doctrinally, the First Amendment should provide protection for at least some anti-food 
sharing laws, though different tests for First Amendment scrutiny will be appropriate for different 
kinds of food sharing laws.  Convincing courts to apply the proper test is crucial.  Analogizing 
food sharing laws to restraints on charitable contributions and begging can help advocates frame 
many food sharing laws as what they are: laws that criminalize a particular kind of expression on 
behalf of the homeless. 
The first barrier that advocates must overcome is to demonstrate that sharing food is ex-
pressive conduct by applying the Texas v. Johnson test employed in First Vagabonds Church.203  
Texas v. Johnson provides a two-part test for whether conduct is sufficiently expressive to receive 
protection.204  First, challengers must show they have “an intent to convey a particularized mes-
sage.”205  For members of Food Not Bombs and other organizations bringing these challenges, 
this subjective measure of intent will likely be satisfied.  Second, the challengers must show there 
is a great likelihood that the message would be understood by those who view it.206 
The Second Circuit’s explanation in Loper for why begging is expressive conduct pro-
tected by the First Amendment also applies to food sharing.  Like being asked for money, the 
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mere fact of seeing people queuing for free food is expressive.  People who witness group feed-
ings are forced to think about the plight of the homeless. 
Group feedings by organizations such as Food Not Bombs or churches are even more 
expressive than asking passers-by for money.  Group feedings are in fact more similar to the cha-
ritable solicitations that the Supreme Court recognized in Shaumberg.  The expressive impact of 
begging is enhanced by the indirect effect that begging requires hearers to consider the social 
problem of poverty.  In contrast, group feedings such as those by Food Not Bombs are explicit 
about the political content of their activity.207  Evidently then, they are more like solicitors for 
charity who explain their activity is in support of political causes. 
The fact that organizations such as Food Not Bombs are expressing their protest through 
an act that can also be utilitarian does not then mean that they are not protected by the First 
Amendment.  The Supreme Court has recognized that other utilitarian conduct can be expressive.  
In Clark v. Community for Creative Nonviolence, the Supreme Court assumed that sleeping could 
be an expressive activity under the right circumstances.208 
Other courts should not use the “reasonable observer” test the Eleventh Circuit applied in 
First Vagabonds Church.  The Supreme Court requires courts to look at the whole expression, not 
the least expressive aspect of conduct.  In Texas v. Johnson, the court decided that burning a flag 
was protected expression because of the explanatory speech that surrounded the conduct. 
[In the case, the activists] burned an American flag as part – indeed, as the cul-
mination – of a political demonstration that coincided with the convening of the 
Republican Party and its second nomination of Ronald Reagan for President.  
The expressive, overtly political nature of this conduct was both intentional and 
overwhelmingly apparent . . .. In these circumstances, [the activists’] burning of 
the flag was conduct “sufficiently imbued with elements of communication.”209 
The Supreme Court’s holding in Rumsfeld v. FAIR that universities treating military re-
cruiters differently from other employers210 was not expressive conduct does not change the re-
quirement that courts must look at the whole context of the expression.  In FAIR, the universities’ 
decision to treat military recruiters differently was only clearly expressing a political opinion 
when accompanied by explanatory speech.211  An entity’s policies towards employees are not ex-
pressive in themselves, and the explanatory speech was not an integral part of the act of changing 
policy.  In contrast, in Texas v. Johnson and challenges to food sharing laws by groups like Food 
Not Bombs, explanatory speech and expressive conduct are essential parts of the same political 
event.  In Texas v. Johnson, burning a flag was an essential, culminating part of a political protest.  
Likewise, distributing food to the needy is an essential, culminating part of the regular protests 
that Food Not Bombs stages.  In the Eleventh Circuit’s case, even the Mayor of Orlando, who was 
trying to prevent the group feedings, recognized they were a component of a political demonstra-
tion. 
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Furthermore, the Eleventh Circuit’s test requires a court to engage in an analysis that is 
almost absurdly myopic.  The court’s test blinds and deafens its reasonable observer to the 
speech, banners, T-shirts and other communications that comprise essential parts of the food shar-
ing conduct.  Thus disabled, the Eleventh Circuit’s observer is not reasonable at all.  Reasonable 
implies the ability to use reason to respond appropriately to actual events.  A reasonable observer 
could see a Food Not Bombs group feeding and would be capable of distinguishing it from a fam-
ily reunion. 
Thus, for good reason, the Supreme Court requires courts to look at the context in which 
expressive conduct occurs.  Political demonstrations that include group feedings must receive pro-
tection under the First Amendment. 
The next hurdle is to convince the court to apply public forum analysis rather than the 
more deferential O’Brien test.  The O’Brien test allows governments to prohibit conduct in which 
speech and non-speech elements are mixed.212  To justify the restraint, the government must satis-
fy four requirements: 
[A] government regulation is sufficiently justified if [1] it is within the constitu-
tional power of the Government; [2] if it furthers an important or substantial 
governmental interest; [3] if the governmental interest is unrelated to the sup-
pression of free expression; and [4] if the incidental restriction on alleged First 
Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that in-
terest.213 
Courts applying the O’Brien test have upheld both anti-begging laws and anti-food shar-
ing laws.  In Young, the Second Circuit applied O’Brien to the prohibition on begging in the sub-
way and found that the test was satisfied.214  The Eleventh Circuit, en banc, also found that if 
sharing food were protected expression, Orlando’s restraint was justified under O’Brien.215  It is 
important to remember that if a court applies O’Brien, a challenge to a food sharing law is not 
necessarily defeated.  The district court in First Vagabonds Church found that the food sharing 
restraints were not narrowly tailored to a substantial government interest, and therefore failed the 
O’Brien requirements.216  However, O’Brien is a more lenient standard for restraints than re-
straints based on the public forum doctrine. 
Challenges to food sharing limits will likely be more successful if advocates can con-
vince courts to apply the more rigorous public forum tests.  The Second Circuit struggled with 
which of the two tests to apply to the anti-begging law in Loper, and implied that public forum 
analysis was more appropriate than the O’Brien test because the restraint on begging was not 
merely an “incidental” restraint on expression.217  Advocates must show that food sharing re-
straints are not incidental restraints on expression.  Laws that only require permits for all food 
sharing, but do not limit the number of permits a group can get are difficult to frame as more than 
“incidental” restraints on expression.  However, laws that put absolute limits on the number of 
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permits an organization can get in a year, or laws that explicitly ban sharing food with the indi-
gent should be seen as targeted at the expression of groups like Food Not Bombs.  These laws are 
not incidental restraints that require them to conform to certain health standards.  They are laws 
that target their particular kind of political activity that requires sharing food. 
If a court is applying the public forum analysis, the final hurdle for challengers to the law 
is to convince the court that the restraint is not content neutral.  If the restraint is content neutral, 
the court will apply an intermediate level of scrutiny based on cases such as Ward v. Rock Against 
Racism and Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence.  These cases inquire as to whether 
content neutral restraints are reasonable time, place and manner restraints on speech in a public 
forum.218 
This was the test that the Ninth Circuit applied in McHenry v. Agnos.219  The Ninth Cir-
cuit explained that “restrictions are ‘reasonable’ provided that they are justified without reference 
to the content of the regulated speech, that they are narrowly tailored to serve significant govern-
mental interest, and that they leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the in-
formation.”220 
Laws that require permits for all large gatherings in parks should be evaluated under this 
test.  Maintaining the health of parks is a government interest not related to the suppression of 
particular speech.  Courts should not apply this test to laws that ban large group feedings or put 
absolute limits on the number of feedings a group may engage in.  Though those laws apply to all 
large group feedings, it is often clear that the real target of the laws are group feedings which at-
tract homeless individuals, such as the ones put on by Food Not Bombs.  Such laws are therefore 
restraints targeted at certain messages. 
Laws that limit the number of times an organization can have a permit for a group feed-
ing directly target organizations like Food Not Bombs.  These laws are analogous to a law the Su-
preme Court invalidated in Forsyth County.221  In that case the government charged organizations 
for parade permits, and the amount of the fee was based on the amount the city would have to pay 
for security for the parade.222  The result was that parades which expressed messages that pro-
voked greater hostility, violence, or disruption from the public cost both the government and the 
parade organizers more.223  The Supreme Court held that this differential treatment made the law 
not content-neutral.224  Laws that limit the number of times an organization can hold a group feed-
ing create similar differential treatment.  Some groups will not be burdened at all by such a limit.  
But some groups, such as Food Not Bombs, have a political message to deliver that requires nu-
merous regular group feedings.  Occasionally protesting war and environmental destruction by 
giving out food is a very different message from protesting war and environmental destruction by 
making a sustained, long term commitment to devote time on multiple days of each week to pro-
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vide sustenance for the needy.  The permit limit laws make the second message impossible to de-
liver. 
If advocates can successfully convince the court that the law is not content-neutral (and 
not merely an incidental restraint),225 then the court will apply a strict scrutiny test based on Perry 
Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n.226  This was the test that led the Second Circuit to 
limit its holding in Young and end the anti-begging law in its landmark Loper decision.227  Under 
Perry, content based restraints on expression in “quintessential public forums” such as parks re-
quire a high level of justification.228  The government “must show that its regulation is necessary 
to serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end.”229  Some, 
but not all, restraints on sharing food would be invalid under this test.  The Las Vegas law that 
barred sharing food with the indigent in parks should be invalidated under this test. 
The path through the numerous tests is winding, and it is made even more confusing by 
the inconsistent manner in which courts have applied them, often “assuming without deciding” 
issues or finding a law invalid under one test but continuing to find it valid under another “even if 
we were to apply” the other test.  Courts need guidance in how to approach these issues uniform-
ly, and advocates for the homeless have been and hopefully will continue to be eager to lead 
courts to apply tests that scrutinize food sharing laws with adequate strictness.  The more similar 
restraints are to the laws banning charitable solicitations and the laws banning begging, the more 
rigorously the law requires courts to analyze them. 
C. Challenges to Food Sharing Laws That Ultimately Fail to Change Judges’ Minds About the 
Appropriate First Amendment Scrutiny Are Still Important 
Sacco v. City of Las Vegas and McHenry v. Agnos illustrate another impact litigation 
strategy that relies less on the legal outcome of the case than the publicity that a lawsuit can gen-
erate.230  In Sacco the litigation led to pressure on the city to settle the lawsuit, and it settled by 
agreeing to reform its policies to allow food sharing to continue under more reasonable regula-
tions.  In McHenry, the litigation gave publicity to an issue that does not see headlines very often, 
and the members of Food Not Bombs may not be the only residents not voting for the Mayor be-
cause of his efforts to harm the poor and stifle the expression of Food Not Bombs.  Even in juris-
dictions where winning a challenge to a food sharing restraint may be difficult, the challenges still 
may still be useful because of the political pressure they can exert on elected officials and city 
administrators concerned about the cost and negative press of litigation. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The First Amendment was not written with the “prolixity of a legal code.”231  The re-
straints that it imposes on governments are not obvious from the text, and government actions that 
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were once unrestrained can be restrained in the future through new interpretations of the First 
Amendment.  The history of the rights to solicit donations, beg for money, and give food demon-
strate that sustained advocacy can convince judges to change their interpretations of what freedom 
of speech entails. 
Equality has an important place in the First Amendment.232  The First Amendment de-
fends the public from governments that might seek to stifle the expression on which democracy 
depends.  The First Amendment promotes a public sphere where democracy can thrive.  Re-
straints on expression that only burden the poor exclude an entire class from that public sphere. 
They thus contravene the purpose of the First Amendment. 
The restraints on begging and food sharing exclude specific groups and messages from 
the public sphere.  Restraints on begging exclude those who rely on begging to express publicly 
their pleas for support.  Worse, they allow governments to drive the very poor out of the public’s 
sight and suppress their message about the reality of poverty in our communities.  Restraints on 
food sharing burden the ability of organizations like Food Not Bombs to deliver a potent message 
on behalf of the poor.  Simply informing people of their political message is not the same message 
as distributing food in conjunction with their other activities.  For Food Not Bombs, the medium 
is the message.233  Restraining their demonstrations allows governments to stifle their message. 
The Occupy movement may have changed the conversation about economic injustice, 
but it has not yet changed the law.  A complex system of restraints has spread across the United 
States and seeks to keep the poorest Americans out of (so-called) public spaces.  The Occupy 
movement has embraced the First Amendment as a tool to protect their own rights to occupy pub-
lic spaces.234  The Occupy movement could also be a chance to engage the First Amendment to 
assault the laws that try to keep the poor out of places like Zuccotti Park. 
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